Abstract-
INTRODUCTION
Issues of land tenure have shaped Colombian history since the colonial era and continue to shape the nation's political economy today. The competing interests of the peasantry and the landed elite materialized as a result of the development of capitalism and the commercialisation of agriculture as the country became more deeply assimilated into world markets. Understanding the Colombian conflict requires an appreciation of the country's historical trajectory of agrarian change, the violent expression of social tensions in its wake, and the particular ways in which these dynamics were influenced by the changing global context.
The analysis presented here reveals that Colombia's conflict does not easily fit into any model of civil war. In particular, a deeper understanding of the intimate ties between violent conflict and agrarian questions in Colombia, both historically and in their contemporary manifestations, provides grounds for a critique of conventional notions of the conflict-development nexus. On the one hand, the common claim that 'poverty increases the likelihood of civil war' may contain an element of truth (Collier et al. 2003, 53) . 1 On the other hand, this article challenges further claims made on the basis of the supposed relationship between poverty and violence, specifically, 1) that war is development in reverse and 2) that the best solution for preventing and overcoming conflict is economic growth and development. This analysis of the Colombian conflict casts doubt upon those claims by demonstrating that capitalist development can itself be violent and even produce poverty. Furthermore, the Colombian case shows how the use of violence to achieve certain ends is not confined to repressed, marginalized and poor groups, but is also used by elite classes to maintain and impose a particular development model.
The first section of the article provides a brief review of mainstream ideas about the nature and causes of civil war. It then looks at a debate that has been sidelined by the many theorists and policy makers, concerning competing versions of the conflict-development nexus. Subsequent sections challenge conventional notions of the relationship between development and violent conflict. Section two provides a theoretical framework of agrarian questions within which the case of Colombia is considered. Section three recounts the historical antecedents of the Colombian conflict and its relation to agrarian change. The fourth section of the article examines the contemporary (focusing on the Uribe era) links between agrarian questions and violence in
Colombia. This segment of the article draws on government data, legislation, press releases, national and international newspaper articles, and international and local NGO reports, 2 in order to disclose the continuing significance of land struggles and how they are inextricably linked to capitalist development and global forces.
I-THEORIES OF CIVIL WAR AND THE CONFLICT-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS
Internal wars have dominated armed conflict since the second half of the twentieth century (UCDP 2010). Academic and policy research accordingly shifted its emphasis from interstate to intrastate war. Many analysts have reached contradictory conclusions as to the causes and nature of contemporary warfare. In this section, I explore those ideas and examine how they have been applied to the case of Colombia. Particular attention is paid to one key theme in the civil war discourse that has generated significantly less debate: the conflict-development nexus.
Theories of Civil War: A Brief Literature Review
Mary Kaldor (2007) contends that conflicts at the end of the 20 th century are distinctively 'new' in several key ways. She claims that the lines dividing war rooted in political aims and organized crime are increasingly unclear and that even 'internal' conflicts are 'transnationalized'. The victims of 'new wars' are more likely to be civilians than militia: modern warfare technology is used not to 'win hearts and minds' but to create 'fear and terror'. For Kaldor, the use of the term 'war' is a deliberate way of highlighting the political character of new forms of violence. However, other new war proponents have argued that as conflicts have become increasingly 'criminal' they are also increasingly a-political; Enzensberger, for example, claims that 'they are wars about nothing at all
[…] violence has been freed from ideology' (quoted in Kalyvas 2001, 103 , emphasis in original).
The implication is that while in the past, wars were propelled by the pursuit of political causes, today's conflicts are simply meaningless violence. Kalyvas (2001) maintains that this is a 'double mischaracterization' based on incomplete or biased information, and that it overlooks ethnographic research on the complexities of civil war.
Similar discussions have been central to the 'greed versus grievance' debate. For Collier (1999) , 'narratives of grievance' disguise 'economic agendas' that are advanced through civil war.
This type of conflict model relies on neoclassical economic axioms and rational choice theory to explain how individuals decide whether to join a rebellion by weighing up potential costs and gains.
'Conflict risk' is understood to be a function of the combination of poverty (where people -it is assumed -have little to lose by entering into armed conflict) and existence of primary resource wealth (providing opportunity and incentive for gain). Collier and Hoeffler's study based on statistical data from 78 civil conflicts between 1960 and 1999 concludes that there is 'little evidence for grievances as a determinant of conflict' and that the 'greed model provides much better explanatory power ' (2002, 1) . Qualitative analyses tend to produce different conclusions.
Economic opportunity is sometimes found to be an influence in determining the 'duration, intensity and character of conflict', but not a 'primary cause' of internal wars (Ballentine 2003) . Other critiques stress that even poor people, who are assumed to have a lower opportunity cost in violence, have their lives to lose (Cramer 2006; Gutiérrez 2004) . Another problem identified by
Collier's critics is that grievances themselves are often economic; for example, it is unclear why low income should not be considered a source of grievance. As pointed out by Gutiérrez (2004) , if scarce economic opportunities are what drive rebellion, whether their activities involve looting or not, should we really call this 'greed'?
The issue of natural resources is a further area of contention. The 'resource curse' is treated by some theorists as a causal explanation for conflict. Although some analyses have found that there is no correlation between the weight of primary resource exports in the GDP and likelihood of conflict, there are also studies that claim a significant relationship (Ross 2004) . In contrast to 'resource curse' studies, others focus on how resource scarcity (e.g. water) and environmental degradation generate conflict (Maxwell 2000) . There is no clear consensus in the conflict literature about the role of natural resources. Competing interests (national and international) in natural resources (whether scarce or abundant) play a key role in conflict, but what matters is not the simple existence of these resources or even dependence upon them, but rather how they are managed, how political questions of power interact with economic and material issues (Cramer 2006, 123) .
Another area of research has revived a tradition from classical political theory concerned with the relationship between Liberal values (predominantly democracy and free trade) and violent conflict. Brückner and Ciccone (2007) claim that low income growth increases the probability of civil war in non-democracies, but not in countries with strong democratic institutions. While Hegre (2001) found that 'coherent' democracies and authoritarian states are least likely to experience civil war, while 'intermediate regimes' run a high risk. The 'pacifying commerce' thesis has also been re-established in contemporary conflict theory. Some analysts argue that there has been a decrease in the number of active internal armed conflicts in recent years that can partly be attributed to trade and globalisation, which supposedly allow people to acquire wealth through peaceful rather than coercive means (Griswold 2007) . Another study finds that trade openness discourages 'severe' civil wars but can also create risks for smaller-scale internal conflicts (Martin et al. 2008) . In any analysis of civil war, it must be taken into account that statistical studies designed to assess the relevance and impact of any particular variable such as democracy or international trade are of limited use. Cramer refers to econometrics as 'far too crude an analytical tool ' (2003, 409) . This type of approach tends to overlook the complex ways in which a variety of factors play out in the diverse contexts of armed conflict.
Colombia and Theories of Civil War
Academics and political analysts have tried to fit Colombia into one of these 'models' of war. For instance, the role of the cocaine industry in financing illegally armed groups has often been used to advance a 'resource curse' explanation. Angrist and Kugler (2008) found that rising coca prices and production in Colombia were directly linked to an upsurge in rural violence. However, the term 'resource curse' is questionable since it implies that the resource simply exists and is available for predation. Coca, like any other crop, must be cultivated; and therefore its' role in the conflict can only be understood within the context of wider agrarian structures. Moreover, the resource alone explains little; armed groups existed before the cocaine industry, and rebel groups also fund themselves through racketeering and extortion, cattle theft, bank robberies and kidnapping.
For some analysts the illegal drugs industry is more than just a means of financing combat; it has become an end in itself. Collier uses Colombia as an example of a greed-based civil conflict, pointing to insurgent involvement in the drug trade as an indication of criminality (1999, 8) .
Francisco Gutiérrez challenges the application of the 'greed thesis' to the Colombian rebel groups, emphasising that the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) explicitly forbids the use of the rebellion for personal gain, so that 'even admitting the possibility that a handful of individuals actually gets rich with the war, which until now has not been proved, the vast majority of the organization has no possibility whatsoever of doing so, and knows it' (Emphasis in original 2004, 269). Moreover, if material interests were the only motivation for joining illegally armed groups, then guerrillas would be unable to compete with paramilitary organisations, which pay their combatants salaries and tolerate looting (Gutiérrez 2004 (Gutiérrez , 2008 resembles much more the 'new wars' description than the contemporary conflict ' (2006, 142) .
Finally, the continued targeting of left-wing academics, journalists, trade unionists and social leaders by state and paramilitary forces forcefully undermines the idea that the conflict has become a-political.
The violence in Colombia is not a simple case of one group of armed actors against another.
High levels of generalized crime, guerrilla attacks against both infrastructure and civilians, human rights abuses committed by the military and the paramilitaries, disputes between drug gangs, and massive human displacement; all contribute to a mixture of violence that does not fit into the traditional definition of civil war. For example, the 'casualty threshold' definition that tallies the number of 'battle-related deaths' in order to determine when a violent situation can be labelled 'war', 4 excludes many of the types of violence described above. 5 Moreover, under such a definition, volatile statistics might lead one to believe that Colombia has had various distinct civil 4 This depends on the classification system used, and ranges from between 25 to 1,000 mortalities per year. Some dispute the classification of the Colombian conflict as a 'civil war' on this basis. However, according to data provided by CERAC, Colombia's internal conflict meets the quantitative criteria for it to be labelled a 'civil war' because between 1988 and 2002, conflict-related deaths did not drop below the 1,000 mark and rose considerably in the late 1990s, reaching over 4,000 in 2002. Restrepo et al. argue that other datasets may underestimate the severity of the Colombian conflict. For example, the UCDP dataset only counts 'battle-deaths', more specifically those killed in combat between government forces and guerrilla groups; it excludes paramilitary related violence and attacks on civilians. In contrast, CERAC includes attacks on civilians perpetrated by both guerrillas and paramilitaries, in addition to battle-deaths (Restrepo et al. 2006). wars. 6 This is misleading, since the contemporary Colombian violence cannot be disconnected from that of the 1990s, 1980s the or even 1950s. Arguably, there is a certain degree of continuity in the Colombian conflict as well as discontinuity, represented as different but not isolated phases.
The many forms of violence in Colombia, which are not all officially dubbed 'war-related', are not isolated problems; they are interlinked in complex ways. For these reasons, I adopt the term 'violent conflict' rather than the more problematic 'civil war'.
The Conventional Conflict-Development Nexus
Analyses of the Colombian conflict have played a key role in challenging the various competing theories in conflict studies. However, there is one key theme that has received much less critical treatment in dominant discourse: the conflict-development nexus. The World Bank Policy
Research Report, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, is representative of the conventional understanding of the relationship between violent conflict and development.
The report has two principle claims: that 'civil war is development in reverse,' and that development is an 'effective instrument for conflict prevention' (Collier et al. 2003, 1) . According to the report, the countries with 'the highest risk' of civil war are the 'marginalized developing countries' with low and declining per-capita incomes and growth, characterized by inequitable distribution and dependence on primary commodities. While natural resources provide finances for illegally armed groups, low incomes provide 'a pool of impoverished and disaffected young men who can be cheaply recruited by entrepreneurs of violence' (Collier et al. 2003, 4) . All of these factors are assumed to be a consequence of poor policies, governance and institutions.
The most common explanations for civil war, such as ethnic and religious rivalry or colonial legacies, it is emphasized, are not supported by the report's statistical evidence. Such grievances are widespread and do not consistently produce violence: 'although political conflict is common to all societies, civil war is concentrated in the lowest-income countries' (Collier et al. 2003, 91) .
While it is acknowledged that 'partial' democracies may be more susceptible to war, the authors insist that democracy in low income countries does not guarantee against conflict. Having discarded the explanatory power of a long list of factors, it is concluded that 'the key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development' (Collier et al. 2003, 53) .
The version of the conflict-development nexus presented in this World Bank Report has become a key paradigm of mainstream thinking in both development and conflict studies fields.
This consensus is reflected in the 'Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development', signed by 42 countries, committing to support 'efforts to integrate armed violence reduction and conflict prevention programmes into national, regional and multilateral development frameworks' (2006, 1) . In spite of -or even because of -its widespread influence and acceptance, the conclusions of this report warrant examination.
Cramer's Conflict-Development Nexus
One of the few to scrutinize the conventional conflict-development model is Cramer, who challenges the claim that 'war is development in reverse' and puts forward an alternative supposition: progress and development require 'momentous transitions' that are typically 'brutal' (2006, 44-5) . The view that war is entirely negative, he argues, can 'only be sustained by a form of historical amnesia' because 'Western and more or less liberal civilisation had violence at its foundation, in war, slavery, imperial adventure and primitive accumulation ' (2006, 9, 43) . For
Cramer contemporary conflicts are best understood as manifestations of the 'contradictions' of 'late transitions to capitalism ' (2006, 13) . The transition to capitalism is often violent for various reasons. In the context of rapid social change there is an opportunity to contest the 'terms of accumulation', the institutions that establish these terms, and how wealth is distributed. The development of capitalism depends on the establishment of private property rights that are by their very nature exclusionary and therefore likely to generate conflict. One of the key elements of the violent transition to capitalism is primitive accumulation, which Cramer defines as a 'twin process of forceful asset accumulation and displacement of people ' (2006, 217) . Finally, international factors (fluctuations in global commodity markets, the presence of multinational companies or foreign aid agencies, the influence of international financial institutions, military aid or intervention, etc.) may further fan the flames of violent conflict (Cramer 2006, 215-6 ).
Cramer's notion of violent conflict, based on Marx's 'tragic view of history', like Liberalism, is rooted in a belief in progress, but from one standpoint violence is enabling and from the other it is disabling. Cramer himself recognizes that there is a danger that the argument could be used to romanticize, justify or encourage violence and war in the name of progress (2006, 47) . He maintains that 'violent transitions' to capitalism have no definite outcome and that there may be 'no end in sight'; he thereby avoids professing that violent conflict is necessary or positive and also warns the reader against the temptation of trying to distinguish between 'good and bad wars' or those that promote 'progressive' change and those that are 'negative and destructive' even in their long-term consequences (2006, 48, 238, 284) . However, he fails to address the notion of progress itself. Cramer uses the terms development and progress interchangeably; defining development as industrialisation and the spread of capitalism (2006, 254) . Therefore, it can be deduced that for
Cramer the spread of capitalism is favourable for the 'improvement of the human condition' and the 
Colombia and the Competing Conflict-Development Theses
Initially, a few basic points can be made regarding the conflict-development nexus in Colombia.
First, poverty is clearly a key factor in explaining violence; however, recognising that poverty plays a role in generating conflict does not imply that conflict should be resolved and prevented through 'rapid growth and integration into global markets', as the World Bank (WB) Report suggests (Collier et al. 2003, 101) . In fact, poverty may be generated in processes of capitalist development such as primitive accumulation as will be discussed later. This produces a cycle (confounding the logic of the conventional conflict-development nexus): capitalist development is a violent process that causes poverty and inequality, which fuel further violence. Poverty is of course, not the only factor fuelling violence; to assume this is equivalent to stating that the poor are the most violent actors in a conflict, which is not the case. Both elite groups and marginalized or 'poor' sections of society have used violence to pursue particular ends.
Second, contrary to the implication of the hypothesis presented in the World Bank Report, in Colombia, a protracted violent conflict sits comfortably with a history of almost unbroken economic growth, 7 and often incidences of intensifying violence coincide with high growth rates. In his analysis of the Colombian conflict, Richani challenges the view that war has exclusively negative impacts on the economy, arguing that 'markets of violence-like all other markets-present opportunities for the formation, accumulation, redistribution and investment of capital ' (2005,115) .
The 'conflict trap' in which Colombia is stuck has little to do with declining or stagnant economic growth. In fact, violence has played an important role in capital accumulation in Colombia, as will be discussed in sections III and IV of this article.
Third, Colombia has one of the highest levels of inequality in Latin America: 20% of Colombians claim 60% of national income (World Bank 2009) and this is certainly an important dynamic in the conflict. However, linking economic inequality to violent conflict is not enough. In fact, there is no clear causal statistical relationship between measures of income inequality and the incidence of civil war. This does not imply that inequality is irrelevant to our understanding of conflict; as pointed out by Cramer 'it is about visible and felt inequalities at the local level rather than the extremes of the Gini coefficient and the ratio between earnings of the richest and poorest quintiles of the population ' (2003, 405) . It is necessary to examine the 'social, political, cultural and historical' facets, as well as the economic aspects of inequality (Cramer 2003, 408-9) , to examine how inequality is created, maintained and contested through violent means and how it is shaped by capitalist development. It is important to understand how inequality frames 'collective identities' upon which mobilisation is based, such as identification with a particular social class:
e.g. peasants and landless labourers versus traditional landowning class and agribusiness elite.
Finally, Colombia (at least superficially) has a well-functioning government; another a-typical feature of conflict states. The WB Report supposes that 'poor policies, governance and institutions' create the conditions for a high risk of violent conflict or civil war. But Colombia has a reputation as a neoliberal role model and a history of close cooperation with international financial agencies, particularly the World Bank. Government institutions and bodies provide public services and perform bureaucratic duties, and various political parties compete in electoral processes; thus, Colombia is not usually classified as a 'failed state'. Nevertheless, it was precisely the absence of state presence in certain areas of the country, particularly agricultural frontier zones of peasant colonisation, which explains the emergence of armed groups. According to Sánchez, 'both guerrillas and Self-Defense groups explain their origins in almost identical terms: the incapacity of the State to fulfil specific economic, social and cultural obligations in the case of the guerrillas, and, in the case of the paramilitaries, the State's inability to carry out the essential function of the modern nation, that of guaranteeing public security ' (2001, 25) . The Colombian government has tended to either flout its responsibility for resolving social conflicts, leaving them to be settled by illegally armed groups, or to respond itself using military repression. This has been visible in its handling of the agrarian question.
Colombian policy has often been based on the assumptions of the conventional developmentconflict consensus described above. Both national and international forces have taken steps to integrate security and development policy. President Uribe's 'National Development Plan' reflects this as do international aid agency development programmes. Many security-development projects are rurally based and relate directly to the government's treatment of the agrarian problem and the violence it has engendered. At the same time, the history of the Colombian conflict attests to
Cramer's opposing notion of the conflict-development nexus. As will be shown, violence is very much rooted in struggles over the 'terms of accumulation', in the agrarian sector in particular.
Furthermore, the conflict has been exacerbated by the particular ways in which Colombia was integrated into the global capitalist system and the 'contradictions' that 'late transitions' entail.
II-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN QUESTIONS
Colombia's protracted internal conflict has explicit ties with the nation's transition to capitalism and accompanying agrarian questions. It is not unusual for agrarian transitions to be conflictual, and yet for the most part, with a few notable exceptions such as the work of Cristóbal Kay (2007) , contemporary conflict studies have ignored this issue in their analyses. This section provides a brief explanation of what is meant by the term 'capitalist development', followed by an overview of some key themes in agrarian political economy. These ideas have a strong resonance in the subsequent sections of the article which examine the specific case of Colombia.
Capitalist Development
The World Bank and other international institutions fail to acknowledge that development is shaped by a global capitalist logic that is not necessarily peaceful. In fact, mainstream development and conflict literature mostly ignore the concept of 'capitalism' outright. In overlooking the development of capitalism, these analyses arguably have only a partial view of the dynamic processes that influence violent conflict. Using Ellen Wood's definition, 'capitalism is a system in which goods and services, down to the most basic necessities of life, are produced for profitable exchange, where even human labour-power is a commodity for sale in the market, and where all economic actors are dependent on the market ' (2002, 2) . Capitalism engenders an insatiable drive for capital accumulation through production for the market, governed by the 'fundamental rules' of 'competition and profit-maximization'. The entire organisation of social life is subject to these 'imperatives', as Wood calls them, which are rationalized using notions of 'productivity' and 'improvement', both ultimately measured in terms of exchange value or profit (2002, ' (2009, 218) . In Colombia, this process of 'broadening and deepening' the capitalist 'market imperative' in the agrarian sector has been particularly violent.
In challenging the conventional conflict-development nexus, the main argument set out in this article, that capitalist development can be both violent and produce poverty, rests upon an original observation of Karl Marx. The establishment of private property and a labour force dependent on the market for its subsistence, both necessary for the development of capitalism, are rooted, according to Marx, in 'the primitive accumulation'. In Marx's own words: 'The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process', while 'the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in the letters of blood and fire ' (1999, 365) . Just as capitalist accumulation requires and creates a society dependent on the market for its reproduction, it also requires and creates a 'relative surplus-population' or 'disposable industrial reserve army ' (1999, 352) . As accumulation proceeds, the reserve army of labour and consequently poverty expands: 'capital increases its supply of labour more quickly than its demand for labourers ' (1999, 354) . Fundamental to the 'General Law of Capitalist Accumulation', Marx writes, is 'an accumulation of misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital'; thus 'pauperism forms a condition of capitalist production and of the capitalist development of wealth ' (1999, 362, 360) . In addition to drawing links between capitalist development, violence, and poverty, Marx's analysis directs us to the centrality of the agrarian sector in this process. developmentalism ' (1917-1973) , and then reignited in the era of 'neoliberal globalism' that followed. For Araghi, the long development era, defined by nationalist and reformist sentiment, The result has been a 'massive process of dispossession by displacement of the world's peasantries' which has produced a gigantic 'reserve army of migratory labour' (Araghi 2009, 112; 134; 118-120) .
Agrarian Questions
For Henry Bernstein, the classical agrarian question of capital has been rendered obsolete, at least from a worldwide perspective, as a result of globalization: 'for capital on a global scale, the definitive questions of continuously raising the productivity of labour in farming, the production of cheap food staples, and the agrarian sources of industrial accumulation have been resolved ' (2009a, 250) . At the same time globalization engenders a 'new agrarian question of labour' rooted in 'the underlying contradiction of a world capitalist system that promotes the formation of a world proletariat but cannot accommodate a generalized living wage' (Arrighi and Moore quoted in: Bernstein 2004, 204) . This 'crisis of reproduction' and the related 'fragmentation of classes of labour' explain, he argues, the resurgence of land struggles and agrarian populism (2009a, 254).
According to Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2009b) the agrarian question in the contemporary era of neoliberal globalisation continues to be constituted by the three classic elements: production, accumulation, and politics. Land is central to all three of these elements (Akram-Lodhi, Kay and Borras 2009 ). In the current era, the control of land is shaped by what the authors call 'neoliberal agrarian restructuring', a process that diminishes the role of the state and expands the role of the market in rural societies. The propagation of land markets ensures that allocation is determined by the capitalist logic of competition and profit-maximization. Access to land is a priority for the growing global agro-export industry which as it expands its activities intensifies the bifurcation of agrarian space into 'export oriented' and 'peasant producer' subsectors. This process has tended to either 'reinforce' or 'resurrect' unequal land access and exclusionary agrarian structures (AkramLodhi, Kay and Borras 2009 ).
Relevance of Agrarian Questions to the Colombian Conflict: An Overview
Colombia's integration into world markets during the era of 'colonial-liberal globalism', as Araghi The ties between the global food regime and social crises in the global South (as analyzed by Araghi and McMichael) are manifest in Colombia. The dedication of vast tracts of land to cattle grazing and export-crops exacerbated spiralling food prices and increased both export and import dependency, making the economy vulnerable to the volatility of international commodity markets.
The hasty expansion, following liberalisation, of imports of subsidized goods such as wheat and cotton ruined many domestic producers, and arguably this was not unrelated to the impressive growth of illicit crops during the same period. The formation of the cocaine industry in Colombia, which transformed armed conflict, has patent ties to the configuration of agrarian change. The foreign exchange earnings generated by coffee exports spurred economic development, fomenting a gradual integration of the domestic market. The industry driving the process was concentrated in the Andean zone, one of the key areas of peasant colonisation. Thus coffee production was sustained by both peasant producers on minifundio or small plots mostly located on the mountain slopes and large-scale cultivation on the latifundios that tend to dominate the flatlands of the valleys and plateaus. The independent involvement of the peasants in the accumulation process threatened the status of the landlords who attempted to maintain their monopoly over agrarian structures. The peasants, in turn, were ever more resistant to their subordination (Zamosc 1986, 11-12) . Many colonos who were sent to open the frontiers for commercial coffee plantations began refusing to hand over land after clearing it, while sharecroppers and renters refused to comply with traditional obligations within the haciendas. The loss of social control combined with the 'inability to compete with the advantages of the peasant economy' culminated in 'the final crisis of the haciendas' (Fajardo 1983, 26 (Fajardo 1983, 32-39) .
III-AGRARIAN CHANGE AND THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT
In the 1920s the agrarian question, for the first time, was on the national political agenda.
Industrialists demanded action, complaining that high food costs translated into high labour costs were slowing down accumulation. The 'emergency' measures taken in 1926 that temporarily lowered tariff walls were met with strong resistance from landowners. Rising imports combined with a fall in international coffee prices led to growing deficits. Meanwhile, agrarian conflict had reached new proportions. Tenants on the traditional haciendas were becoming increasingly defiant.
The emerging rural proletariat rallied for better wages and working conditions. As land values Union or UNIR (1933), which got involved in uniting and mobilizing peasants, rural day labourers, and indigenous groups (Zamosc 1986, 12-3; Fajardo 1983, 38-40; Galli 1981, 50-1) .
The 1930s marked a growing interest in a 'new model' of development in Colombia. Some of the more 'progressive' elements of the ruling classes proposed a shift away from reliance on primary commodity exports to something akin to import substitution industrialisation based on strengthening the manufacturing sector and enlarging the home market. The decade began with the election of the Liberal party which, breaking almost 50 years of Conservative rule, passed legislation establishing protectionist tariffs and the rights of workers to form unions. Two concerns were central to the national development debates. First, how (production AQ) the agricultural sector could best provide low priced food for the expanding urban population and cheap inputs for industry (accumulation AQ). Second, the urgent need to contain explosive rural conflicts (politics AQ). However, more radical policy objectives were limited by the political influence of agroexporting interest groups and traditional latifundio classes (Fajardo 1983, 47) . The Colombian experience of developmentalism would also be constrained by its strong ties to the USA, which made it largely an example of what Araghi calls 'Western-oriented, market-led national developmentalisms' as opposed to 'socialist or state-led' versions (Araghi 2009, 123-4) .
Elected in 1934, President López Pumarejo argued that necessary changes would either come about through 'agrarian reform or violent revolution' (Hirschman 1963, 142) . Law 200 of 1936 was the first serious attempt to organize land ownership since colonial times. The objective was to modernize the agrarian sector and encourage production; thus, the law stated that 'ownership exists in favour of those who occupy the land and make economic use of it' (Dix 1967, 88) . The net effect of the reform was to produce further chaos. In many regions, violent conflicts erupted as landlords scrambled to evict tenants and squatters, which instead of increasing agricultural output, in many cases provoked the conversion of large estates into cattle pastures. The 'land judges' responsible for mediating disputes tended to rule in favour of fellow elites, leaving the latifundios largely intact (Richani 2002, 19-20) . Moreover, many hacendados used the reform as an opportunity to extend their territorial claims; acquiring private property rights over public or communal lands (Reyes (Richani 2002, 22) . By prohibiting the planting of perennials by a tenant or a sharecropper without permission from the landlord, the potential for land redistribution was undermined, since this demonstrated the long term activity required to apply for a title. At the same time, preventing the peasantry from cultivating coffee limited their independent participation in the accumulation process (Dix 1967, 94) . Dissatisfaction with the conservatism of the ruling class was reflected in the rapid popularity gained by Jorge
Eliécer Gaitán, a political outsider who appealed to both urban labour and the peasantry with populist and reformist rhetoric. Gaitán was assassinated on April 9 th of 1948, one year after being appointed leader of the Liberal party. Massive urban riots followed, taking the lives of several thousand people (Sánchez and Meertens 2001, 11-3) .
Although rural violence had accelerated years earlier, Gaitán's murder is often cited as the pivotal moment that unleashed Colombia's so called civil war. During this epoch of intense violence, the Colombian economy did not 'retreat into subsistence activities' (Collier et al. 2003, 156) as the conventional conflict-development model predicts. Manufacturing and commercial agriculture both grew rapidly throughout the 1950s, with overall economic growth averaging at 6.6%. These sectors benefited from the accelerated dispossession of the peasantry resulting from widespread violence. Usurped lands served the expansion of agribusiness projects particularly in the departments of Tolima, Cudinamarca, and
Valle de Cauca, while the displaced filled both rural and urban demands for cheap wage labour.
Rapid proletarianisation combined with the violent repression of unions contributed to a 15% decline in rural sector salaries between 1948 and 1958, to the advantage of capital accumulation (Fajardo 1983, 72-80) . Capitalist development and violent conflict went hand in hand.
Counterinsurgency and Developmentalism in the 1960s-1970s
Following the installation of the National Front, the remaining insurgents lost the official backing of the Liberal party which began to refer to them as bandoleros or bandits-a derogatory term initially only used by the Conservatives. INCORA granted claims for large landholdings even in the 'new settlement regions'; thus unequal land distribution was in some areas 'extended' by 'the titling program'. Support for production growth and productivity improvements through rural infrastructural projects, credit programs, and technical aid, also tended to favour commercial estates over smallholders (Felstehausen 1971, 167-75; Fajardo 1983, 102-5; Berry 2004, 12) . The agrarian reform program was clearly aimed at containing what counterinsurgency doctrines refer to as 'growing pains' (Clemis 2009, 164) , i.e.
conflicts arising as part of the development process itself, but evidently not at promoting a genuine transformation of unequal rural structures.
Throughout the 1960s, USAID, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank all provided development assistance to Colombia with the explicit priority of supporting the development of commercial export crops. This was reflected in loan allocation decisions:
Colombia's first agricultural World Bank loan in 1949, followed by one in 1954 and another in 1966 were all designated for the commercial sector, cattle ranching and mechanisation programs, NOT for small-scale farming projects (Galli 1981, 36-45) . In sharp contrast to the ideas espoused by the ECLA scholars, a report published as part of the first ever International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (now the World Bank) mission in 1950, argued that small-scale agricultural production in Colombia constituted a 'mal-use, misuse and under-use' of both land and labour. Lauchlin Currie, the director of the mission and author of the report, favoured a development model based on the expansion of large agribusiness and 'accelerated' migration from rural to urban areas (Brittain 2005, 340-2) .
This was precisely the type of agrarian transition that had been taking place. Even in the context of agrarian reform, both international and national forces continued to prioritize the 'modernization of the hacienda' in their policy decisions. Mechanization, which had kicked off in the 1950s, expanded with the support of foreign and domestic subsidies. Vast tracts of flat lands were transformed into labour-saving commercial estates producing sugar cane, cotton, rice and sesame. In the second half of the sixties, state credit programs increased their support for commercial export projects (933% in African palm production, 821% for soya and 607% for cotton). The value of production represented by large-scale commercial agriculture (defined by mechanization, salaried workers, and sizeable input costs) increased from 13.4% of the total in 1950 to 42.6% in 1976 (Fajardo 1983, 87-8, 109-22) .
The expansion of agricultural exports, which grew by an average of 8.7% a year throughout the 1960s, had problematic corollaries in domestic food production. Prices of staple goods rose rapidly; by the close of the decade, three-quarters of Colombian families used half of their income to purchase foodstuff (Galli 1981, 70-1) . Apart from contributing to a national food crisis, the rapid dissolution of the peasantry was driving massive rural-urban migration with which industrial employment could not keep up. The rate of population growth in urban areas was more than double employment growth. Job opportunities within agriculture were also declining as a result of increased mechanization and the expansion of livestock grazing activities-often themselves responses to labour mobilisation (Felstehausen 1971, 177) . New 'peasant leagues' were forming all across the country and there was a potent revolutionary threat from the recently formed guerrilla groups. Reformism once more became an apparent political necessity. President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966 Restrepo ( -1970 wanted to intensify and expand INCORA's work (including compulsory land redistribution in areas of traditional latifundio), but his proposals were resisted by the congress and the landowning class it represented. The bill that was finally passed in 1968 was limited (Zamosc 1986, 47-50 Currie, considered 'traditional peasant production' to be a major 'obstacle' to national development (Fajardo 1982, 121) . In early 1972, in a meeting held between members of the Liberal and Conservative parties and private sector representatives, it was agreed that in return for estate taxes, the government would guarantee firm restrictions on land expropriation and continue to provide extensive financial and institutional support for large-scale agriculture. The Pact of Chicoral, as it was known, was according to Zamosc 'a formal declaration of agrarian counterreform ' (1986, 98) .
The National Front officially ended with the inauguration of the Liberal López Michelsen (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) , who swore his loyalty to counterreform. Many of the few haciendas acquired by the government in earlier reform years were returned to their original owners, while the armed forces were used to liquidate protests and social movements (Reyes 2009, 29) . The country's long history of government repression is closely tied to the influence of US counterinsurgency policy which 'has 12 For a detailed explanation of the rise and decline of ANUC, see: Zamosc (1986). sought to insulate the Colombian state from popular pressures for reform' through 'widespread and pervasive state terrorism' (Stokes 2005, 78 The main objectives of the program were to boost salaries by improving productivity in staple food production, forge links between the peasant economy and wider markets, and extend social service provisions in rural areas. 15 Participants were not simply to be drawn into capitalist markets as suppliers of food goods, but as consumers of agricultural inputs, technology, and credit.
'Beneficiaries' were encouraged to adopt new types of seeds, pesticides and fertilizers with costs as much as 575% higher than the customary production investment; costs that were covered by bank loans. The peasant economy, which still accounted for 44% of agricultural production, presented an underexploited market opportunity for multinational agribusiness and financial institutions. On the other hand, the provision of social services (health care, education programs, food handouts) played a key role in placating rural communities. A stable 'semi-proletarianized' peasantry guaranteed a cheap and flexible labour force for expanding agribusiness. In fact, a World Bank report on the DRI project openly expressed the expectation that income from the land would be complemented by seasonal work on commercial estates (Galli 1981, 60-87; Fajardo 1983, 125-41) . According to Galli (1981) , the objective of the DRI in Colombia was not to promote a genuine transformation of minifundia production, but to ensure that commercialisation and land-concentration could proceed with minimal disruption.
ANUC denounced López's counterreformist and repressive policies while arguing that DRI was not the solution to the peasantry's problems. It was clear that the government was not willing to renegotiate land redistribution and a new campaign of land invasion and mass rallies ensued.
The government responded by stepping up state terror and repression. Eventually, a number of factors, especially ideological differences, led to the disintegration of ANUC, which by the end of the decade had clearly failed to establish a path of agrarian development that favoured the peasantry (Zamosc 1986, 179-202) . For decades, import substitution policies had been used to protect an agrarian sector monopolized by a landowning elite that benefited from scarcity and rising prices.
The powerful landowner's guild SAC (Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia) had managed to divert state development resources to their advantage while comparatively very little government support was provided for smallholder agriculture (Fajardo 1983) . At the same time, land concentration remained extremely high despite various agrarian reform legislations. 16 Thus, for
Colombia's rural underclasses, developmentalism was never the 'golden age' it was supposed to be.
Arguably, disillusionment with the failures of ANUC and the repressive and violent responses to pacific resistance contributed to the growth of armed struggle, which up to this point had mostly been indiscernible. Reyes directly associates the expansion of guerrilla groups with the defeat of the peasant movement at the end of the 1970s. He argues that the era represents a 'turning point':
the moment in which the central government turned over its responsibility for resolving social conflict to armed groups (2009, (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) .
The Drug Economy and the Consolidation of Armed Groups in the Global Neoliberal Era
Colombia entered the eighties, like so many other countries, in a state of economic decline: by 1982
GDP growth had fallen to 1.5% compared to a 6.1% average between 1970 and 1978. According to Fajardo, land concentration (monopoly land rents accounting for 15-20% of agricultural production costs) and increased dependency on foreign technology (also a large percentile of production costs, variable according to the crop) had caused a structural agrarian crisis (Fajardo 1983, 151-7) . The declining profitability of legal crops was perhaps one causal factor in the rapid shift to marijuana and coca cultivation. There were changes in arable land surface during this period as a result of colonization of the agricultural frontier. For a more detailed overview of the data, see Fajardo (1983) .
urban areas. 17 Finally, it further complicated the legitimacy of an already shaky political establishment.
The quick formation of the illegal drug economy in Colombia was facilitated by the existence of large numbers of impoverished people in marginalized rural areas. This was a consequence of the path of agrarian development outlined above, which combined labour-saving technology and cattle ranching activities with violent efforts to dispossess the peasantry, pushing them into frontier lands outside the reaches of state control-the ideal location for illicit crops. The FARC did not encourage the cultivation of coca, but reluctantly 'decided to accept the activity ' (Gutiérrez 2004, 265) , perhaps in part because it could offer no viable alternative to the peasants to augment their incomes. The FARC began to mediate relations between the narcotraffickers and the peasants/rural labourers who cultivated the coca. However, it is important to emphasize that 'with or without the insurgency, for the small farmers of these regions the cultivation of the primary material for drugs is a necessity' (Sánchez 2001, 31) .
The 'coca boom' not only provided a boost to the peasant economy, but also to the financial position of the FARC who profited from the taxes they applied to the illicit industry. The new income, at least in part, explains the strengthening and expansion of the armed group. During this period, the FARC expanded its operations into areas of latifundio/agribusiness and regions of natural resource wealth where the potential for increasing 'protection rents' was high, it set up strategic fronts near medium/large cities and small towns, and followed the migratory movements linked to the 'coca rush' into new colonization zones (Richani 2002, 75-80) . Confrontations with the army, massacres, extortion, pillaging, and attacks on infrastructure all increased significantly during this time period. According to Gutiérrez (2004) , around 1978 there was a shift from earlier eras defined by 'guerrillas without war' to an epoch of outright 'war'. Nevertheless, Gutiérrez also warns that although the income from the illicit drugs industry undeniably has a key role in the FARC's finances and therefore the scale and durability of its fighting capacity, often this relationship is oversimplified, pointing out that 'the organizational take off of the FARC preceded its becoming a full-fledged warlord of coca territories' while reminding us that the group also 'amasses huge resources through kidnapping, racketeering, and extortion ' (2004, 265-6) . Other financing methods notwithstanding, over time, the guerrilla's links to the cocaine industry multiplied.
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The more offensive stance adopted by the FARC provoked a response from businessmen, In 1997, the Castaño brothers led the many regional paramilitary groups to unite under the umbrella organization, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or AUC (Livingston 2003, 77-8) .
Despite their diverse origins, what united these groups was their mission to eliminate the insurgency, which 'within the CI discourse promulgated by US CI strategists […] was defined so broadly as to encompass practically any form of dissent' (Stokes 2005, 78) . Thus, paramilitary groups terrorized the civilian population: massacring peasant communities accused of collaborating with the guerrillas and carrying out assassination campaigns targeting individuals in both rural and urban areas suspected of sympathizing with the insurgency (Stokes 2005, 74-7) . This forcefully undermined democratic paths to resolving the country's conflict, 19 and opened the door to some of the worst years of violence.
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The result of the consolidation of paramilitarism combined with the growing force of the narcotrafficking business was increased land concentration or what some observers refer to as the second and third phase of agrarian counterreform from the 1980s until the present (Caballero 2008) .
As noted by Cubides, 'there is an impressive correlation between the growth of huge agricultural estates as a result of the investment of drug money and the growth of paramilitary groups ' (2001, 132) . The 'narcobourgeoisie' or 'new elite' is said to have acquired more land -4.4 million hectares by the mid nineties -in just a few years than INCORA distributed in thirty (Richani 2002, 33-4) . This process of violent land usurpation and its links to capitalist accumulation will be discussed at greater length in the following section of the article.
Rapid social changes in the agrarian sector were matched by macroeconomic shifts that also impacted rural conflict. Compelled by the global transition to neoliberalism, in 1990 the Colombian government initiated a process of economic liberalisation known as the apertura or economic opening. Non-tariff trade barriers were removed immediately, while average agricultural sector tariffs were reduced gradually from 31.5% to 15% between 1991 and 1993. Deregulation of financial markets encouraged massive inflows of foreign capital that led to a rapid appreciation of the peso, undermining the price competitiveness of Colombian exports. Between 1990 and 1997 overall agricultural output growth marked historical lows, while for some crops it declined massively (e.g. barley, cotton, soybeans, sorghum, and wheat). The declining rate of returns for certain crops caused many estates to be converted into cattle pasture (Jaramillo 2001, 822-38) .
While the number of hectares planted with coca expanded from 37,500 in 1991 to 163,300 in 2000 (UNODC 2006, 81) .
Total agricultural imports increased by an annual average of 23% during the same period, with particularly devastating consequences for cotton production. The agrarian crisis that followed liberalization prompted large landowners, represented by the SAC, to launch a campaign pressuring for renewed state intervention. The government to a great extent acceded to demands, announcing an 'emergency' recovery effort including refinancing for distressed agribusiness and special tariff treatment for 'politically sensitive crops'. Increased incentives such as export subsidies provided for the expanded production of palm oil, sugarcane, flower and bananas throughout the 1990s. The agricultural sector remained central to the national economy; accounting for over 30% of national employment and more than a third of foreign exchange earnings by the end of the decade (Jaramillo 2001, 822-38; Richani 2002, 96) . On the whole, the Colombian government continued to provide support for the commercial agricultural sector in the neoliberal period, just as it had throughout the developmentalist era, albeit a change in crop emphasis receptive to global market opportunities.
Given that sugar, banana and palm oil agribusiness have proven links with paramilitary groups, and are located in regions of intense land conflict (Richani 2002, 145) , government incentives for export-led development have apparently become entangled in the violent conflict.
This was the setting for the third and most recent endeavour to implement agrarian reform, which had returned to the global development agenda in the 1990s (after losing popularity in the 1970s) in the form of 'negotiated land reform' or 'market-led agrarian reform' (MLAR).
Negotiated land reform is based on pro-market principles: it assumes that problems of corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy can be overcome by limiting state involvement and that conflictual expropriation methods should be completely abandoned and replaced with voluntary transactions in which land is bought and sold for immediate cash payments at market prices (Borras 2003, 367-77) .
The emphasis is on developing markets; thus 'MLAR is integrally and intimately intertwined with The market-led approach to land reform seriously understates the role of social and political factors shaping the agrarian problem. The 'market value' of land in Colombia frequently exceeds its productive value as a result of the speculative accumulation described above. The negotiation process envisaged by MLAR proponents involves 'voluntary land transfers based on negotiation between buyers and sellers' (Deininger 1999, 651) . This stands in contrast to the reality reflected by the well-known Colombian paramilitary aphorism: 'If you don't sell, we will negotiate with your widow'. In sum, the agrarian reform project of the 1990s was implemented in accordance with the 'Pact of Chicoral', which two decades earlier had vetoed the possibility of carrying out a genuine agrarian reform. Meanwhile, the violent agrarian counter-reform described briefly above, continued into the new century. Despite the publicized process of 'transitional justice', the Uribe administration (2002-2010) did little to address the violent agrarian problems inherited from the nation's history.
IV-ÁLVARO URIBE AND AGRARIAN COUNTERREFORM
The 21 23 For example: The 'falsos positivos' are civilians (mostly young men from poor neighbourhoods) who were 'disappeared' then murdered by the army to later be presented as dead insurgents in order to improve combat statistics. Over 900 cases which occurred between 2007 and 2008 and another 716 denouncements are being investigated (Semana 2009a) . 24 The success of the avid Uribista Juan Manuel Santos in the recent presidential race suggests that for the electorate these issues are secondary to the great advances made in the countries security. 25 A questionable figure, since according to other sources, this many paramilitary members never even existed and very few of the demobilised guerrillas have been accepted for JPL proceedings. use of violence to accumulate land and repress labour has proved particularly favourable to domestic and foreign agribusinesses.
Paramilitary Violence and the Agrarian Counter-reform: Dispossession by Displacement 27
In spite of the favourable reports of enhanced security, there were between 3.3 million and 4.9 million internally displaced people in Colombia as of January 2010. The government body 'Social Action' estimated that 6.8 million hectares of land had been I myself found the businessmen to invest in these projects which are durable and productive'.
Second, the 17 th Brigade of the National Army not only provided security for the industries, but was also involved in pressuring landowners to sell to the companies. Some members of the brigade even held shares in the ventures. Third, the regional government body in charge of environmental protection did nothing to stop the imposition of the monoculture in forested areas and allowed the companies to carry on without an environmental license. Fourth, a number of INCODER staff allegedly 'permitted or encouraged these actions of dispossession'. Finally, the Superintendent of Private Security gave multiple permits to the companies allowing them to hire firms to 'protect' their businesses (Quevedo and Laverde 2008) .
In sum, the palm oil dossier confirms the trinity of interests formed by certain sections of the state, the paramilitaries, and an agribusiness elite. In fact, often one person may be all three at once.
These three powers, together, are violently imposing a particular type of agrarian development.
Interestingly, notions of 'progress' and 'development' are commonly used in justifications given by the accused palm oil businesses; one man stated, for example: 'forced displacement was not the fault of the palm oil businesses, whose only driving interest is to make the region a prosperous place
[…] one of the most worrying things is that they attack the palm oil projects without proposing another formula for progress in the region' (Quevedo and Laverde 2008) .
The Chocó palm oil scandal is often presented as an isolated and unfortunate incident (Carroll 2008 ). However, the problems associated with the palm oil industry are not exclusive to the region.
Research conducted by the NGO Human Rights Everywhere (HREV) documents illegal appropriation of land by methods such as usurpation through forced displacement, use of fraudulent documents, and purchase of land through armed coercion, plus the use of the palm businesses to launder drug money, in all six of the different regional palm complexes in Colombia. The report concludes that human rights violations do not occur as 'isolated cases at one company or plantation, but are […] an integral part of the production model' (Mingorance 2006, 24) . together 'in the interests of reconciliation' but in some cases the victims have to work as employees on farms which were once their property' (Mingorance 2006, 41) .
For many the palm tree has become a symbol of terror and injustice; for others the same tree is an icon of Colombia's potential for economic growth. By 2005, Colombia was the fifth largest palm oil exporter in the world (Mingorance 2006, 12) . Anticipating that global demand will rise as biofuels become more popular, the government has promoted the expansion of the palm oil industry as a great development opportunity for the country. President Uribe stated that palm oil production exemplifies the country's commitment to sustainable environmentally-friendly development was not listed as one of the official owners of the business and therefore could not have known that they were inadvertently sponsoring paramilitary and drug trafficking activity. Ironically, the USAID grant was part of a Plan Colombia counter-narcotics project (Ballvé 2009 ). In sum, there is a clear tension between the idea that economic development and growth contribute to peace and the violent reality of the imposition of export-led growth projects in Colombia.
Agrarian Counterreform as Primitive Accumulation
This 'bloody counterreform' fits Cramer's definition of primitive accumulation as 'a twin process of forceful asset accumulation and displacement of people ' (2006, 217) . It also supports his claim that contemporary conflicts are shaped by integration into the global capitalist system since the 'primitive accumulation' described above is influenced by the interests of export agribusiness and the global food system for which it produces. In the case of Colombian agrarian counterreform, some of the land has been accumulated for purely speculative purposes. In this instance, primitive accumulation impacts negatively on productivity. However, in many cases usurped lands have been transformed into infrastructure, tourism, resource extraction, or agribusiness projects; which in terms of profitability, economic growth, export earnings and other capitalist notions of progress, count as development. The agrarian counterreform, then, is an example of the violence of capitalist development.
But if we accept 'primitive accumulation' as a facet of capitalist development, does that imply that Colombia's bloody agrarian counterreform should be accepted as part of progress? The answer is no, primarily because of the subjectivity of the concept of progress discussed earlier. In order to avoid implicitly condoning the violent persecution of the lower rural classes, it is necessary to reject the normative claim of productivism, which understands the development of the productive forces to be a desirable process at all costs. It also means denying, as McMichael put it, that an 'assault on rural cultures is inevitable or desirable ' (1997, 648) . Cramer (2006) himself argues that there is 'no guarantee' that primitive accumulation will lead to a successful transformation to a 'dynamic capitalism' that 'generates improving material conditions' for the general population. In his view primitive accumulation has three major functions. The first, which relates to the contribution of the usurped lands to capitalist accumulation, is occurring in Colombia in so far as the lands acquired through the counterreform are the sites of new agribusiness, natural resource extraction, or other types of profitable projects.
In terms of the second function, the creation of a wage labour force, the displaced in Colombia have successfully been detached from the means of production and thus made dependent on the wage labour market for their survival. However, the market on which they have been made dependent has not been able to provide for their subsistence. Over 60% of displaced families suffer food The bitter irony of this is evident: Uribe has consistently encouraged the prioritisation of production for export at the expense of national food needs.
According to conventional development theories, increased productivity in agriculture lowers reproduction costs of labour (i.e. better technology means cheaper food and therefore lower wages) but because technological investments in Colombia have tended to favour the production of export-goods for foreign consumption over the production of food for national consumption, food prices are not decreasing. In the past, the reproduction costs of wage labour in rural areas were in part covered by their own subsistence production, as noted by De Janvry (1981) and Galli (1981) , but the agrarian counterreform has undermined this by dispossessing people of their land. At the same time, the smallholder/peasant economy which in the past was the main provider of the food required by urban labour has been slowly destroyed. Instead of repressing wages through economic mechanisms, violence is used to guarantee a low cost labour force.
Repression of Social Protest through Armed Violence
Labour and more generally popular social movements are often controlled, like land, through deploying state forces claiming that the protests were infiltrated by the FARC, and a number of protestors were killed by police bullets (Semana 2008e, 2008f) .
At the same time, popular social struggles are less and less the concern of guerrilla groups which increasingly use extortion and terror against the civilian population from which they are supposed to seek support. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Colombia's violent conflict has been created by a complex web of issues with the nation's agrarian development at its centre. In the beginning of the 20 th century, the growth of the Colombian coffee export sector incited the first phase of conflict. The new market presented an opportunity for campesinos whose independent participation in the economy was seen as a threat by the traditional landowning elite. The failure of the state to arbitrate in agrarian conflict, largely due to the unwillingness of the traditional ruling classes to make economic and political concessions, 
